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Blyler: NOTES
Antitrust Laws and Union Powers

by the Florida Supreme Court, but this will not be a satisfactory conclusion. For an equitable resolution of the competing interests of the
taxpaying municipal citizen and the injured party, the legislature must
bestir itself to bring to fruition the purpose underlying the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in the Hargrove case.
SyLvIA

J.

HADAwAY

ANTITRUST LAWS AND UNION POWER
INTRODUCION

It is generally recognized that the concentration of economic power
within unions has increased substantially since the 1980's, when a labor
policy was adopted to promote unionism. In the almost three decades
that have elapsed since the adoption of such a policy, the method of
regulating the growth of this power has formed the core of several labor
statutes presently in force.1 It is widely contended 'that these statutory
provisions have been unable to deal effectively with the growth of union
economic power, and that the power has reached such proportions that
it is exerting adverse effects on the functioning of our economic system.
It is also contended that the reason for this situation lies in the almost
complete immunity from federal antitrust statutes that labor unions
presently enjoy.2
The latter contention has been the source of a long and controversial
debate.3 The debate has been stormy, and analytical understanding of
the problems involved has suffered, on the one hand, from the emotionalism inherent in the situation, and on the other, from a serious lack of
reliable economic information.
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§101-10,
113-15 (1958); Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§141-44, 151-67, 171-82, 185-88, 191-97 (1958) (Supp. 11, 19591960); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29
U.S.C. §§401-531 (Supp. 11, 1959-1960).
2. See Cm.imfnn, TAE EcoNoMnC ANALYsIs or LABoa UNION PowEs (1958);
PouND, LEGAL h tM rms OF LABoR UNIoNs (1957).

3. See, e.g., Barnes, Unions and the Antitrust Law, 7 LAB. L.J. 133 (1956);
Dooley, Antitrust Legislationand Unions, 11 LAB. L.J. 911 (1960); Iserman, The
Labor Monopoly Problem, 38 A.B.A.J. 743 (1952); Kamin, The Fiction of "Labor
Monopoly": A Reply to Mr. Iserman, 38 A.B.A.J. 748 (1952).
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The insufficiency of our economic knowledge is not widely recognized by the layman. Popular opinion to the contrary, there is profound
disagreement among professional economists concerning many of the
charges leveled at union power.4 Why? The answer lies in the nature of
a free economy, wherein there exists a multitude of economic variables
that can be neither controlled nor predicted. Such diversity and unpredictability preclude analyses capable of encompassing the entire
social dimension.
An awareness of the inadequacy of our economic knowledge, plus a
national abhorrence of the detailed social and economic regulation that
would be necessary to achieve more economic certainty, led to the adoption of the concept of "industrial self-government." That is, when the
social ills of the wage earner manifested themselves in the early part of
this century, and society groped for a cure, collective bargaining through
strong unions appeared to be the only means of affording protection to
the working man while avoiding detailed government regulation. In
other words, unions as a counterbalance to employer economic power,
or "industrial self-government," appeared to be the only system of
industrial relations consistent with the functioning of a free economy.
Subsequent labor legislation has attempted to regulate the rapid
growth of union power and still remain consistent with the policy of
industrial self-government. It is no secret that the present labor measures
do not adequately resolve the problems of union power. However, proposals that overlook the limitations of our economic premises and become sweeping in nature-catchall types-may very well create problems
as distasteful as any they might solve. The antitrust approach to curbing
union power must be examined closely to see whether it avoids this
pitfall.
ANTIrrUST LAW As APPLIED TO UNIONS TODAY

The pattern of our antitrust policy toward labor consists of three

7
federal statutes, the Sherman, 5 Clayton, 6 and Norris-La Guardia Acts,

plus many court decisions interpreting legislative intent. An examination of the pattern begins with the Sherman Act, which was passed
in 1890.
The general purpose of the Sherman Act was to deal with the problem of preserving business competition and preventing restraints of
4. Rees, Do Unions Cause Inflation?, 2

J. oF LAw & EcoN. 84

(1959).

5. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1958).
6. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§12-27, 44, 29 U.S.C. §52
(1958).
7. Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§101-10,
113-15 (1958).
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trade. Section 1 of the act provides that "every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.""
There was considerable difference of opinion whether Congress had
intended to exempt labor unions, but within a few years several lower
court decisions applied the act to union activities. 9 It was not, however,
until eighteen years after the enactment of Sherman that the inclusion
or exemption controversy was settled. The Supreme Court ruled, in the
historic DanburyHatterscase,10 that labor unions were within the scope
of the act.
The Danbury decision, when combined with Standard Oil Co. v.
United States," which held that the government had the power to dissolve combinations in restraint of trade, created a threat to unions. In
apparent response to this threat, Congress enacted the Clayton Act in
1914.
The Clayton Act presumably exempted labor combinations from the
coverage of the Sherman Act because section 6 provided that the antitrust laws should not be "construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor .. .organizations .. .from lawfully carrying out the legiti-

mate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade . .. .-2 Supplementing this provision, section 20

barred the federal courts from issuing injunctions "in any case between
an employer and employees . ..involving, or growing out of, a dispute

concerning terms or conditions of employment...."13
The belief that the Clayton Act gave blanket antitrust immunity was
rudely jolted by the decision in Duplex PrintingCo. v. Deering.14 The
decision demonstrated that there was no change in the illegality of boycotting as viewed in the Danbury Hatters case, since the protection
afforded by section 20 applied only in disputes between an employer
and his own employees.
Since the Clayton Act had also provided that private parties had the
right to secure injunctions against antitrust violations, the effect of
Duplex was the increased use of the injunction as a weapon against
8. Sherman Act, §1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
9. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (N.D. II. 1894); Blindell v. Hagen, 54
Fed. 40 (E.D. La. 1893); United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council,
54 Fed. 994 (E.D. La. 1893).
10. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).

11. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. Clayton Act, §6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1958).

13. Clayton Act, §20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. §52 (1958).
14. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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unionism. A multitude of decisions restraining organizational activities,
union rights to engage in strikes, picketing, and boycotts resulted. 15 A
confused body of law grew, because the views of courts sharply differed
as to the legitimate functions of unions.
Congress reacted once again by passing the Norris-La Guardia Act
in 1982. The primary purpose of the act was to restrain court interference
with union activities by providing that federal courts no longer had
jursidiction to enjoin or restrain any union activity confined to a 'labor
dispute." To effect this end, 'labor dispute" was defined to include "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relationof
employer and employee."16
With the passage of Norris-La Guardia, the statutory pattern for the
application of federal antitrust law to unions was formed. However, the
total impact of Norris-La Guardia was not realized until a series of
Supreme Court decisions between 1940 and 1945. These decisions have
to a considerable extent settled labor's present antitrust status; they bear
examination.
First came the decision in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.'7 In this case,
the Court was confronted with a factual situation involving a sit-down
strike and the seizure of the company's plant that was intended to force
unionization upon the employer. After seizing the plant, the strikers
prevented the shipment of finished orders of hosiery that were destined
for points outside the state. The company sued for treble damages under
the Sherman Act on the ground that the prevention of shipment or
delivery of goods in interstate commerce was a restraint of trade.
The Court held that the restraint of the movement in interstate
traffic was not the kind of restraint of trade at which the Sherman Act
was aimed. Justice Stone stated for the majority that a restraint of
"commercial competition" is illegal under the Sherman Act only when
its "purpose or effect was to raise or fix the market price."18 Merely to
prevent interstate shipments in order to enforce ordinary labor demands
was not considered to have such an aim: 1 9
Since, in order to render a labor combination effective, it must
eliminate the competition from non-union made goods ... an
15. E.g., Minerich v. United States, 29 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1928); Waitresses'
Union, Local 249 v. Benish Restaurant Co., 6 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1925); Montgomery
v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 293 Fed. 680 (9th Cir. 1923). See FRANxFmFmR
& GrENE,
Tim LABoR INjmcToN 173-76 (1930).
16. Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 73 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §113
(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
17. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
18. Id. at 500. (Emphasis added.)
19. Id. at 503-04.
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elimination of price competition based on differences in labor
standards is the objective of any national labor organization. But
this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind
of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman
Act.
Apex was the last judicial word on the meaning of the Sherman Act,
as applied to unions. However, as Professor Archibald Cox has pointed
out, 20 the decision left many important questions unanswered. For
example, what did Justice Stone mean by "commercial competition"?
What did he mean by "purpose and effect'? Is this potentially crucial to
the construction of 'labor dispute" under Norris-La Guardia? Professor
Cox says that these points become important because of the movement
in some quarters to return to Apex.
There was no time to deal with the questions raised by Apex, because
one year later the antitrust status of labor union activity was determined
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson.21 This case involved a jurisdictional dispute between the millwrights' and machinists'
unions over the installment of machinery. The work was assigned to the
machinists, and the millwrights" union struck, requesting its members
throughout the nation to boycott the employer's goods.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, stated that "whether
trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be
determined only by reading the Sherman Law and section 20 of the
Clayton Act and the Norris-La Guardia Act as a harmonizing text of
outlawry of labor conduct."2 2 The result of such a reading was to make
all union conduct that was non-enjoinable under section 4 of Norris-La
Guardia, 23 immune to prosecution under the Sherman Act. The often24
cited quote from this case is:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine

with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit . . . are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness
of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.
The last of the "Big Three" decisions on the current antitrust status of

20. Cox, Labor and The Antitrust Laws-A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 252, 263 (1955).
21. 812 U.S. 219 (1941).
22. Id. at 281.
23. Norris-La Guardia Act, §4, 47 Stat. 70 (1982), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§104 (1958).
24. 812 U.S.at 232. (Emphasis added.)
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labor was the decision in Allen-Bradley v.Local No. 8 IBEW.2 5 The
problem arose from a situation in which the union had arranged with
contractors and manufacturers of electrical equipment to exclude all
non-union and out-of-city electrical goods from the geographical jurisdiction of the union.
The Court upheld an injunction against the union, finding that the
union contracts were not restricted to union self-interest, but were part
of a larger scheme of producing a business monopoly. Thus, the Court
applied the rule enunciated in Hutcheson that union action taken in
conjunction with a non-labor group and aimed directly at affecting
prices or suppressing competition removes the antitrust immunity of
the union.
Summarizing the present position of labor unions under antitrust
law, it may be stated that so long as union activity is confined to "labor
disputes," and there is no combination with non-labor groups, unions
will not be subject to the jurisdiction of antitrust law. However, this
statement is loaded, for debate continues over what constitutes a legitimate "labor dispute."
Should the term "labor dispute," as it appears in the Norris-La
Guardia Act be more narrowly construed? One view adheres to the concept of union "self-interest" as set forth in the Hutcheson case. That is,
"labordispute" must be given a broad construction in order to effectuate
the Congressional policy of promotion and perpetuation of collective
bargaining as a means of maintaining industrial self-government. Operating from this premise, this view holds that the lawfulness of union
than on a judgment as to
activities should depend on overt acts2rather
6
the propriety of their immediate aims.
The other view, calling for a narrow construction, places emphasis
on the governmental policy of preserving a competitive business economy. The 1955 report by the Attorney General's national committee,
which was appointed to study the antitrust laws, adopted this view. The
committee concluded that union activities aimed at "fixing the kind or
amount of products which may be used, produced, or sold, or the
number of firms which may engage in their production or distribution"2 7 do not give rise to a "labor dispute" because they do not relate
to conditions of employment.
The question immediately arises as to how and by whom these aims
are to be determined. This is the problem in reconciling 28the two fundamental policies of collective bargaining and competition.
25. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
26. Cox, supra note 20, at 269.
27. REPORT oF =Hx ATroRNEY GENERAs'S

NATIONAL COMMITEE TO STUDY THE

ANTrRUST LAWS 294 (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).

28. See subheading "Functional Controls," infra.
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LABOR MARKETS AND PRODUCT MARKETS

Much of the confusion surrounding the labor and monopoly issue is
the result of a failure to be precise in the use of technical terms. Attention has been called to the fact that unqualified application of the term
"monopoly" to labor union activities has created damaging misconceptions about the nature of unions and labor markets. 2 9 The term "monopoly" was developed as a technical term to describe certain relationships
in the product markets of our economy. The indiscriminate employment
of "monopoly," with reference to labor markets, has created "superficial
analogies that stimulate name-calling, obstruct real investigation, and
cramp analysis within the confines of a preconceived pattern." 3 0 Therefore, the assertion is made that basic to the analysis of the labor monopoly issue is an understanding of the distinction between labor markets
and productmarkets.
The importance of this distinction and related union activities is
revealed by analysis disclosing the fact that many of the labor monopoly
charges and proposed legislative solutions have been based on a faulty
analogy to business monopoly. The breakdown is said to occur in the
following manner: 3 1 Antitrust law rests on the premise that proscription
of combination in the product markets will promote a more truly competitive situation. When this premise is tested in the labor market its
validity is highly questionable, in that economic research has disclosed
that competition in the technical sense does not exist in the labor market,
even in the absence of unions.
This conclusion is reached by the following comparison of the characteristics of the two markets:
(1) A supplier in the product market can generally withhold
his product, or cut back supply without loss of value when the market price is deemed to be unsatisfactory. When the supplier in the
labor market (the individual worker) confronts an unsatisfactory
price (wage), any attempt to withhold his supply results in an immediate and permanent loss.
(2) Commodities can generally be transferred easily from an
unfavorable to a favorable product market. Labor, on the other
hand, is relatively immobile because of various ties to a particular
community, and more importantly, frequent inadequate personal
knowledge of alternative employment opportunities.
29. See Lester, Reflections on the "Labor Monopoly" Issue, 55 J. PoL. ECoN. 513
(1947).
3o. Ibid.

STAFF OF HousE COaM. ON EDUCATION & LABon, 8 7 TH CONG., lST SESS.,
APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LEGISLATION TO LABOR UNIONS 11 (Comm. Print.

31.

1961).
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(3) The buyers in the product market are numerous and varied,
whereas in many labor markets only a few buyers are present.
The foregoing demonstrates that because of the unique characteristics of the labor market, such as the lack of control over supply, a
situation exists in many labor markets whereby a worker must apply for
work on the employer's terms. Supplementing this is the finding that in
most industries, the wage rate is set by a wage leader and followed by
the other firms in the industry. Thus, it is suggested that the valid comparison for the applicability of antitrust laws to unions is "not between
the perfectly competitive labor market and the unionized labor market,
but rather between the non-union imperfectly competitive [labor] mar32
ket and the unionized labor market."
Few serious students of the problem wish to return to the non-union
labor market. Therefore, since the encouragement of unionization is
now a firmly-entrenched governmental policy, the proposition is advanced that antitrust legislation should not be applicable to any union
activity in the labor market. In other words, meaningful analysis of the
labor monopoly issue is not concerned with the monopoly power of
unions in the labor market per se. This view sees the issue as one of
controlling abuses of union power.
Those who have revived the labor monopoly issue because of serious
concern for the functioning of our economic system, rather than mere
emotional antipathy to unionism, are well aware of the facts just outlined. However, 'they see the issue as broader in scope, in that events
over the last several years demonstrate that restraints in the products
market can and do result from union activities confined to the labor
market. Thus, the issue is seen as whether what is now considered
legitimate union power can be limited without sapping the vitality of
unionism.
TAE

REQUEST FOR ANTiTRUST LEGISLATION

The Complaint
No one statement of the case for antitrust legislation would bring
agreement from all proponents of that approach, but the argument has
been summarized by one commentator as follows: 33
First, national multiunit bargaining is high on the list of complaints
of every proponent of antitrust legislation. Even though many employers
approve of multiunit bargaining, the considerable damage inflicted by
32. Id. at 12.
83. Cheit, Public Policy Toward Trade Unions: Antimonopoly Laws, 9 LAB.
L.J. 705,708-09 (1958).
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the "big" strike is now felt to override any efficiency that results from
these bargaining agreements.
Second, the Taft-Hartley Act, as an attempt to cover the areas of
abuse for which antitrust protection has been sought, has not effectively
dealt with the problems. Usually mentioned in connection with this
complaint are secondary boycotts and featherbedding.
Third, the four practices condemned by the Attorney General's study
committee3 4 should be prohibited by specific legislation-union action
aimed directly at fixing: (a) the kind or amount of products that may be
used, produced, or sold; (b) their market price; (c) the geographical
area in which they may be used, produced, or sold; (d) the number of
firms that may engage in their production or distribution.
Fourth, the present day interpretation of antitrust law, together with
the labor statutes in force, has not provided an effective check on union
economic strength. Such great economic power should not exist without
some outside check on its use.
Perhaps this form of presenting the case for antitrust legislation fails
to sufficiently dramatize the seriousness of the problem that union power
poses. The purpose of this approach is to neutralize the strong anti-union
feeling one generally encounters. On the other hand, it must be emphasized, lest one entertaining pro-union feelings tend to discount the
35
charges, that an examination of a few of the "infamous" cases will
convince anyone that critical problems do exist. There are union practices that (1) are difficult to condone, and (2) more importantly, have
deleterious effects on market performance in our economy.
The Antitrust Approach
The application of antitrust laws to labor unions can take one of
several courses, or as has been suggested, a combination approach may
be preferable.3 6 For purposes of presentation, the various approaches
will be examined under the categories, structuralcontrolsand functional
controls.37
Structural Controls. The structural control approach to antitrust
legislation would limit the size of the bargaining unit. The object of
84. REPonRT, supra note 27, at 294.
85. E.g., Hunt v. Crumboch, 825 U.S. 821 (1945); Penello v. UMW, 88 F.
Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950); United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F.
Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 741 (1943) (per curiam).
36. SrAF oF HoUSE CoMMx. oN EDUCAMON & LA~oR, op. cit. supra note 31,
at 47.
37. This terminology is borrowed from Brickner, Labor and Antitrust Action, 13
IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 245 (1960).
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such an approach is the elimination of multiunit bargaining, or, as some
prefer to call it, industry-wide bargaining. The most frequent proposal
encountered would require a separate union for each employer. This
proposal has received considerable congressional consideration, for ex40
ample, the Hartley bill, 38 the Gwinn bill, 30 and the Lucas bill.
The Hartley bill proposed that the National Labor Relations Board
could not certify the same union as a representative of employees of
competing employers. Using the automobile industry as an example, the
bill would have required that there be one union for Ford, one for
General Motors, one for Chrysler and one each for the smaller companies. An exception was made for small local unions of less than one
hundred employees and less than fifty miles apart.
The Hartley bill passed the House of Representatives, but the provisions concerning multiunit bargaining were rejected in the conference
committee, 41 and thus did not appear in the Taft-Hartley Law, as
finally enacted. Similar bills introduced since then have not received
wide support.
Another structural proposal would limit unions to workers in a
particular state.42 An exception to this limitation would be granted if
companies cross state lines. In other words, company-wide unions would
be permitted.
This proposal eliminates, to a certain extent, some of the objections
to the fractionalization of union power (which we will examine shortly),
but as one writer has pointed out, it raises many other problems. 43 For
instance, the extent of mutual assistance among various intrastate and
interstate organizations would certainly present the government with
some difficult administrative problems. For example, in enforcing the
ban on union moneys from outside the limited area, union dues could
be controlled, but can the same be said for "voluntary contributions"?
Would unionization be permitted on a geographical basis or would employee organization be limited on an industrial and/or craft basis? If
the former were selected, the limitation would have little effect upon the
growth of one strong union in a geographical area where an industry is
concentrated in one state, as the automobile industry is in Michigan. If
the latter were selected, problems of definition would arise, especially
in view of the modern trend of product diversification among firms.

38. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
39. H.R. 8449, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
40. H.R. 2545, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
41. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 59 (1947).
42. MACBLUP, THE POLmcAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 432 (1952).
43. Levitan, An Appraisal of the Antitrust Approach, 333 ANNALs oF Am~a.
AcAD. OF POL. & SOC. Scr. 108, 115 (1961).
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Despite these objections, this suggested approach is receiving serious
consideration.
Still another proposal, which is a corollary to limiting the size of
unions, would require competitive bidding among unions. 44 The suggestion is that unions be required to enter into competitive bidding for
the sale of labor services with employers. Every employer would be free
to invite bids from competing union-suppliers. Thus far, it does not appear that this proposal has gained wide acceptance.
The general argument against proposals to restrict the size of unions
is that this approach would not only weaken unions but also destroy
effective collective bargaining. To support this argument reference is
made to the fact that unions cannot protect their members' wage rates
unless competitive employers pay the same rates. It is further pointed
out that the course of collective bargaining would be affected in that
company-sized unions would not be able to marshal the financial
strength required to maintain the type of professional staff that can
effectively negotiate and administer collective agreements. Also argued,
of course, is the fact that union organizing efforts would be seriously
hampered.
Still another consideration of the effect of structural controls is that
limitation of the size of unions would sacrifice the positive contributions
of multiunit bargaining. Generally alluded to is the industrial statesmanship that is evolving out of multiunit bargaining. Upon this evolution
rests the hopes of many for keeping the government out of labormanagement relations. Such a hope cannot be achieved without the
preservation of a union structure whereby labor leaders are able to
develop a national image.
The statesmanship claim is not without foundation. There is ample
evidence of the restraining force large unions often exert on their locals.
One illustration is the case of the International Association of Machinists
in their negotiations with several of the major airlines a few years ago. 4 5
The International had a record of successful negotiations with the industry, but on this occasion the locals conducted their own contract negotiations, company by company. The result was a succession of strikes.
To summarize the argument against structural controls, proposals to
break up unions will result in minimizing or destroying the effectiveness
of these organizations. If the principle of unionism is accepted, such
proposals are inconsistent with that principle, for they would produce a
situation not vastly different from that in which unionism does not exist.

44. Lester, Reflections on the "Labor Monopoly" Issue, 55 J. POL. ECON. 513

(1947).

45. Cox, The Uses and Abuses of UnionPower, 35 No=E DAum LAw. 624, 630

(1960).
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The conclusion that follows is based on the distinction between labor
markets and product markets; that is, combination of unions is a labor
market activity and should not be subject to antitrust law.
Before leaving the subtopic of Structural Controls one other matter
bears mention. Although all the arguments for antitrust legislation are
made to support the structural approach, it appears that at the heart of
the movement is the present concern over the industry-wide strike, or
so-called "emergency" strike. This issue is a subject for penetrating examination in itself, but a few remarks should be made regarding the use
of structural controls as a means of dealing with the problem.
We have just examined the dangers to effective collective bargaining
that sweeping limitation of the size of unions can produce. Again it is a
question whether the costs, in terms of damage to collective bargaining,
would be sufficiently offset by the benefits accruing from protection
against the industry-wide strike.
It would appear that reliance on a structural controls approach to
solve both the problem of preserving a competitive economy and the
problem of the "big" strike is becoming even more deeply involved in a
catchall type approach. The complexities of the two problem areas suggest that they should be dealt with individually, rather than by means
of a law intended primarily to foster market rivalry.
Using the yardstick of flexibility as the main criterion by which to
judge various proposals aimed at dealing with the "big" strike issue, a
proposal which would arm the President with an array of strike settling
46
weapons seems best suited to the task.
Basically, such measures would give the President the authority
when negotiations reach an impasse, to take the following courses of
action singly, consecutively, or concurrently: (1) appoint a fact finding
board with power to mediate and power to make public recommendations; (2) compel arbitration; (3) petition for an injunction for as long
as the President deems appropriate, but with a maximum time set by the
statute, for example, one year; (4) seize and operate with a guarantee
only of "just compensation"; (5) finally, do nothing, because there is
evidence that the parties often come to agreement very promptly when
convinced that no one else will carry the burden.
The purpose of this approach is to facilitate settlement by the parties.
The theory is that by keeping both labor and management guessing and
fearing that the White House will select the weapon least favorable to
the party it considers at fault in not meeting its public responsibility, an
added incentive to settlement will be created.

46. Id. at 635. See Raskin, The Governmentes Role When Bargaining Breaks
Down, Reporter Magazine, Jan. 31, 1963, pp. 27, 30.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss1/6

12

NOTES Laws and Union Powers
Blyler: Antitrust

One objection to these measures is that the party enjoying the greatest political influence with the particular administration will prevail.
The predictability of such a result is extremely doubtful. The decisionmaking process is rarely so simple. A dispute affecting the national welfare creates a multitude of political, as well as economic consequences.
All must be taken into consideration before a decision is made.
Perhaps this is an erroneous assumption, but compared with other
measures being offered, the "arsenal approach" seems best to meet the
need for flexibility, which is so often lacking.
FunctionalControls.The functional control approach for contending
with the labor monopoly issue proposes the imposition of restrictions on
the acts of labor organizations, rather than restrictions on their size. Two
possible courses are considered under this approach: 47 (1) prohibit
particular acts of unions by compiling a list of unlawful acts, or (2)
make legality of any act depend upon its purpose and/or effect.
The compilation of a list of acts deemed unlawful, regardless of purpose or specific effect, is an approach similar to that employed in the
Taft-Hartley listing of unfair labor practices. Some of the acts sought to
be prohibited are already illegal as unfair labor practices under present
law. However, the argument for subjecting the acts to antitrust jurisdiction is, that in the determination of unfair labor practices, the National Labor Relations Board does not take into consideration whether
the acts are restraints of trade. That is, the Board's determination of an
unfair labor practice is concerned with whether the act in question is a
violation of the rules prescribed for collective bargaining. A finding of
an unfair labor practice that also happens to be an act restraining trade
may be said to be protection of a competitive economy, but such protection is indirect and does not sufficiently meet the present needs of the
48
economy.
How is the unlawful acts approach to be effected? Generally, it is
proposed that section 6 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid . . . or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof. . . .49 be amended by excluding
from the concept 'legitimate objects," particular activities deemed to
be objectionable. In general, such a proposal would prohibit union attempts to control or fix prices, to control production, to limit or restrict
47. STAFF OF HOUSE CO2,l. ON EDUCATION & LABOR, op. cit. supra note 31,
at 47.
48. Abramson, Organized Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 3 AnITRUST BULL.
645, 674 (1958).
49. C.AYTON AcT §6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1958). (Emphasis

added.)
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the areas in which goods may be bought or sold, to prevent the introduction or utilization of technological improvements, or to exclude use
by the employer of certain products or services. This legislative proposal
is said to have had the support of the Department of Commerce.
Opponents of the proscription of particular union acts argue that per
se prohibition is too sweeping in that it assumes the acts prohibited are
always harmful to the public welfare. It can be argued that a particular
activity in one type of industry might produce restrictions in the product
market, but the same activity in another industry may promote collective
bargaining with little adverse product market effect.
Another point of contention is that despite a narrowing of the
proscription to particular union acts, the consequence would nevertheless be the return of the administration of national labor policy to the
courts. Professor Archibald Cox has recognized this in a statutory offering of his own. 5 ' His proposal would restrict the courts to the decision of
borderline cases. This is hopefully accomplished by a clear-cut statement of policy in the preamble of the statute, plus an express outline of
the basic distinction between labor market and product market activity,
that would indicate to the courts how they are to regard the enumerated
restraints. For example, concerning the prohibition in section 2 against
limiting the volume of production or sales, the proposed statute expressly
provides the qualification: "otherwise than by establishing hours of employment, overtime premiums, work loads, work standards, or measures
for sharing available work....,'52
If one accepts Professor Cox's basic premise that union activity in the
labor market must not be infringed upon, his proposal is superior to the
Department of Commerce's offering. It is also superior to the Attorney
General's study committee suggestion that such enumerated activity is
already subject to antitrust prosecution because it does not grow out of
a "labor dispute."5 3
The study committee's view raises howls of protest that this notion
represents a regression to the same type of judicial interference that the
Norris-La Guardia Act was designed to restrict. Some will say the courts
are now more enlightened to the delicate balancing that labor policy
requires. Others will argue that it is dangerous to assume that the courts
are any better equipped to administer labor policy now than they were
in the past.
This deeply entrenched opposition to judicial evaluation of the functions of unionism almost overwhelms what is offered as an alternative
50.
51.
52.
53.

Cheit, supra note 83, at 710.
See APPENDIX.
See APPENDIX.
See text at note 27 supra.
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functional control; that is, making the legality of all union acts dependent upon their purpose and/or effect. Nevertheless, it is urged by some54
that Congress change the effect of the Hutcheson case, whereby union
activity is virtually immune from antitrust statutes, so that if the immediate purposes or effects are illegal under the Sherman Act, the exemption would be lost. This would obtain despite the fact that the ultimate
purposes of wages and conditions are valid objectives.
There can be little argument with a rejection of the "purpose and
effecet" theory when its opponents point out the confusion that would
ensue from judicial conflict over basic questions of law. The contention
that this would have a serious unsettling effect on collective bargaining
cannot be rebutted. However, before this theory is totally rejected, the
question should be asked whether the administration of such a policy
must necessarily be turned over to the courts.
CONCLUSION

To restate the issue: The concentration of economic power within
unions has led to a situation in which this power is now exerting adverse
effects upon our industrial markets. The problem: to remove the restraints created by union power while not undermining the perpetuation
and promotion of collective bargaining.
Do any of the proposals examined offer any sort of a solution? The
answer, with perhaps one exception, seems to be "no." The exception is
the "purpose and effect" theory which is at present almost summarily
rejected. Why some form of such an approach may have merit will appear from what follows.
The various antitrust approaches are unsatisfactory because, as their
opponents agree, they are too sweeping. The benefits obtained from such
proposals do not sufficiently offset the costs that are exacted at the expense of collective bargaining. On the other hand, agreement with the
position of the antitrust opponents is difficult when their suggested
remedies proceed from the premise that union activity in the labor
market must be totally protected. Such a position bypasses the very crux
of the problem; that is, restraints in products markets can and do grow
out of union activity legitimately pursued within the confines of the
labor market.
This is not something of which these gentlemen are unaware; however, their awareness of the problem is obscured by their belief that
any restriction in this area will destroy unionism. Their fears are not
completely unfounded, but their assumption is open to question if a

54.

STAFF OF HOUSE Co~zu.

oN EDUCATION & LABoR, op. cit. supra note 81,

at 51.
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labor policy is formulated that is geared toward problem solving in a
market-by-market or industry-by-industry fashion. 5 5 This type of approach would allow a continual balancing of the two goals of competition and effective collective bargaining for that particularindustry.
It seems to be overlooked that antitrust policy toward business
enterprises is not concerned with the negative goal of "trust-busting,"
but instead, with the positive goal of good market performance. It is
submitted that this attitude should and could be used to guide the
formulation of a new labor policy.
A labor policy geared to market performance would remove us from
the horns of the dilemma of trying to pursue a logically consistent
competitive policy and a logically consistent unionist policy at the same
time. Instead, we would depart from absolutes and form flexible rules
which would be flexibly applied.
How would all this be effected? The basis for this approach would
be the application of a "rule of reason" concept. The question whether
industry-wide bargaining is good or bad would not be examined in the
context of the entire economy as is being attempted today, but in the
context of particular market conditions. The same would apply to all
union activities. As a result, if any union activity was found to be exerting adverse effects in the industrial market, steps could be taken to eliminate the source without weakeningthe entire institution of unionism.
To avoid the objections to court administration of policy, administrative bodies would be used. These agencies would be set up for each
of the crucial industries, for it is generally agreed that the serious problems are largely confined to a small but powerful percentage of the
economy.
One advantage that would flow from this kind of administration is
that a great deal of both legal and economic expertise could be mustered.
Moreover, a body permanently attached to a particular industry would
become highly familiar with the intricate workings of the industry. Their
decisions would be obtained more rapidly than through the legal processes, and these decisions would not be made under the pressure of
having to enunciate the 'law of the land."
Perhaps the greatest advantage is that policy would be formulated,
for a change, from economic premises that would be more precise. It is
much easier to isolate the important economic variables for an industry
than for an entire economy.
Admittedly, this proposal is merely a conceptual framework, but
perhaps it is a framework within which a workable solution to our
present-day problems may be formed. There appears to be no panacea,
55. See Schlesinger, Market Realism Versus Logical Absolutes in Labor Reform,
48 VA. L. REv. 58 (1962) for a more detailed analysis of this type of proposal.
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for, as we have seen, the insufficiency of many of our premises continues
to plague us. Perhaps solace can be found in Samuel Butler's observation
that 'life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient
premises." This fundamental dilemma emphasizes that all that can and
must be demanded of any proffered approach is flexibility, for we have
suffered too much already from rigidity in our thinking.
WmLiAm

E.

BLYLER

APPENDIX
This is the text of Professor Cox's proposed statute, which may be found in his
article Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
252, 284 n.117 (1955).
"Section 1. The Congress finds(a) It is the policy of Congress, set forth in the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947, to promote and encourage collective bargaining concerning wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment and, to that end, to safeguard the
right of employees to form, join and assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities
for the purposes of organization, collective bargaining and other mutual aid and
protection.
(b) It is also the policy of Congress set forth in the antitrust laws to prevent
monopoly and promote product market competition among employers in the sale of
goods and services.
(c) Labor organizations, acting alone and in combination with employers, have
sometimes gone outside the sphere of organization and collective bargaining and
have fixed prices, limited production, allocated territory or sales among employers,
and imposed other like restraints on competition among employers in the product
market, all being of a kind which would violate the antitrust laws if imposed by
business groups.
(d) The policy of this Act is to prevent and punish such restraints without
regulating the freedom of employees, labor organizations and their members to
engage in strikes, boycotts or other concerted activities for the purposes of organization and collective bargaining or the negotiation and administration of agreements
relating to the wages and other compensation of employees, their hours and working
conditions, or their tenure and security of employment.
Section 2. It shall be unlawful for a labor organization or its officers or members to
enter into any contract or agreement affecting interstate commerce which(a) fixes prices, or
(b) limits the volume of production or sales (otherwise than by establishing
hours of employment, overtime premiums, work loads, work standards, or measures
for sharing available work), or
(c) restricts the number or kind of employers or other persons who may engage
in any particular kind of business activity or for whom members of a labor organization will work, or the area in which an employer or other person may sell goods or
services, or the persons with whom an employer may do business, or
(d) otherwise, but in like manner, limits access to a market other than a labor
market by employers and other persons engaged in business activity.
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